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Abstract
Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as
intuitively  attractive  as  it  is  controversial.  It  is  notably  at  the  core  of  defenses  of  anti-
physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted
that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness,
stand in (phenomenal) relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and
quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by what their relata are. I
argue  that,  under  some plausible  additional  premises,  no  account  of  what  grounds  these
relations  in  the  essence  of  their  relata  is  consistent  with  Revelation,  at  least  if  we  take
common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation
is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation
postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties.
Keywords:  phenomenal  properties,  revelation,  acquaintance,  similarity,  quantity,  anti-
physicalism
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1 Introduction
The  intimate  epistemic  and  metaphysical  link  between  subjects  and  their  phenomenal
experiences has intrigued many philosophers. Recently, against the background of discussions
over phenomenal concepts and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (Stoljar, 2005, Alter and
Walter,  2007,  Sundström,  2011),  the  debate  has  come to  focus  on  whether  the  nature  of
phenomenal properties is presented to the subjects, a thesis akin to what is often called the
Revelation thesis.
This  paper  aims  to  challenge  a  widely  respected  version  of  the  Revelation  thesis  and
examine the consequences of this challenge. The problem that I shall raise for Revelation can
be put as follows. It is usually taken for granted that there are relations of similarity (e.g.,
between  phenomenal  orange  and  phenomenal  yellow)  and  quantity  (e.g.,  between  two
(phenomenal)  sounds  of  different  levels  of  loudness)  that  hold  between  phenomenal
properties. It is also commonly thought that there is something in the essence of phenomenal
properties  that  makes  them  stand  in  these  relations, i.e.  they  are  internal relations.  If
Revelation is true, that is, the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, then the
essential features of phenomenal properties that ground the relations must be presented to us
too. However, I argue that this contradicts common phenomenological descriptions, which in
turn sheds doubt on Revelation.
The challenge  is  not  straightforward,  though,  as  it  is  controversial  how similarity  and
quantitative relations are fixed by the essence of phenomenal properties. One of the tasks of
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this  paper  will  thus  be to identify these essential  features  by laying out  various different
views, before examining the contradictions that they imply. 
Because phenomenal properties lie at the core of my investigation, it will be useful to say
more about them. To make it clear from the beginning, the way I conceive of phenomenal
properties  here  does  not  exclude  physicalism.  Physicalists  could  accept  the  existence  of
phenomenal  properties  as  described below and  argue  that  they  are  somehow identical  or
reducible  to  physical  properties.  More  generally,  neither  physicalism  or  anti-physicalism
belong to the premises of the argument provided in this paper. 
Phenomenal  properties  are  properties  of  our  experience  that  constitute  its  phenomenal
character, and correspond to what it is like to undergo it. Paradigm examples of phenomenal
properties  are  the  property  of  reddishness,  or  phenomenal  red,  instantiated  by  a  visual
experience of a fire hydrant, the brightness or lightness instantiated by a visual experience of
the sun, the loudness instantiated by an auditory experience of a rock concert, etc.
As  the  previous  examples  show,  this  paper  is  concerned  with  low-level  sensory
phenomenal properties.  Low-level properties are phenomenal properties like (phenomenal)
color,  shape,  pitch,  that  can  be  opposed  to  high(er)-level  properties  like  the  phenomenal
property associated to seeing a house  as a house or the phenomenal property associated to
listening to the voice of my mother as the voice of my mother, which some philosophers also
hold to be irreducible phenomenal properties (Siegel, 2010). I will further restrict myself to
sensory properties,  as  opposed to  (alleged)  cognitive  or  emotional  phenomenal  properties
(Kriegel, 2015).
I  take  it  that  phenomenal  properties  imply  potential  access  for  subjects  undergoing
experiences of them. Subjects can normally focus their attention on them, introspect them,
and form justified beliefs about them.
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To reflect both the way in which phenomenal properties are what-it's-like properties and
the way in which we have potential cognitive access to the phenomenal properties of our
experience,  we can say that phenomenal  properties (and the phenomenal  character of our
experience) involve a  presentation of something to us.  The Revelation thesis  can then be
conceived of as an answer to the following question: What is it that is presented to us?
In the next section I introduce the gist of the Revelation thesis, and identify the variant that
I use in the remainder. I then go on to present in Section 3 the kind of relations relevant for the
argument  discussed  here:  phenomenal  similarity  and  quantitative  relations.  Section  4  is
devoted to a discussion of two major views on how to ground these relations in the essence of
their  relata.  I  conclude  that  they  both  fail  to  accommodate  Revelation,  granted  a  fairly
plausible  metaphysical  assumption,  and  then  briefly  attempt  to  provide  a  generalized
argument against Revelation.  I conclude the paper by examining the consequences of this
possible objection and some possible replies (Section 5). 
2 The Revelation Thesis
There is something about the phenomenal properties of our experiences that makes them
appear very different from other kinds of properties, particularly physical properties. There is
a sense in which there is no difference between what the phenomenal property is and what it
appears  to  be.  This  intuition  is  at  the  heart  of  Jackson's  argument  against  physicalism
(Jackson, 1986), but also of subsequent works on the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy
(Stoljar, 2005). In the recent literature, the notion of Revelation has been used to designate
this kind of intimate presentation of the phenomenal properties to the subjects who undergo
them, and many antiphysicalists have embraced it to argue against physicalism.
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The term “Revelation” was used for the first time by Johnston (1992) in the context of a
discussion about colors, and the claim is explained as follows: “The intrinsic nature of canary
yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual experience as of a canary yellow thing” (p. 223).
That the term “Revelation” was coined for the first time when talking about colors is not
surprising,  since  the  intuitions  underlying  the  thesis  are  perhaps  most  compelling  for
(experiences  of)  colors.  According to  Hardin,  for  example,  “[t]he  hues  are  qualities  with
which we are acquainted.  One can succeed in the task of identifying the hues with some
physical structure only if that structure captures the essential features of the hues as these are
displayed to us in experience” (Hardin, 1988, p. 66). When participants in the debate over
physicalism took an interest in the notion of Revelation, the focus moved from the nature of
colors to the nature of phenomenal properties in general as contenders for what is revealed to
subjects1. 
Roughly, the debate over physicalism has involved Revelation in two distinct ways. The
first way concerns the kind of access to the  fundamental ontological nature  of phenomenal
properties that Revelation makes possible. If Revelation and physicalism are true, then it has
been  argued  that  we  should  be  presented  with  the  physical  nature  of  our  phenomenal
properties. Since it is not the case, we conclude either that physicalism is false (Chalmers,
2003, Nida-Rümelin, 2007, Goff, 2011, 2015) or that Revelation is false (Loar, 1997, Levin,
2007, Schroer, 2010). Others deny that the combination of Revelation and physicalism entails
that we are presented with the physical nature of our phenomenal properties (Damnjanovic,
2012,  Elpidorou,  2016).  The second way has  to  do with whether  the relation  implied by
Revelation  between  the  subject  and  her  phenomenal  properties  can  be  physically
implemented, i.e., satisfies what Levine (2007) calls the Materialist Constraint. Doubts have
1  Another line of research has continued to use Revelation in a context of discussions about the nature of
colors (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007), and has then given rise to a naïve realist take on Revelation (Campbell,
2005, Allen, 2011). This is not the sense of Revelation that interests me in this paper.
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been  expressed  as  to  whether  any  physical-functional  mechanism  could  account  for  the
subject’s special epistemic access to her phenomenal properties enabled by Revelation.
In both ways, Revelation appears to conflict with physicalism. As a result, the objection
that I shall raise against Revelation might indirectly lend independent support for physicalism.
The Revelation thesis has been interpreted in a variety of ways, some of which are more
demanding and plausible than others. The variant of Revelation that I am going to use is the
following:
Revelation The phenomenal (characterization of the) essence of a phenomenal property is
presented to its subject every time she experiences the phenomenal property.
Several remarks about this definition are in order.
Strictly  speaking  I  should  talk  of  the  phenomenal  characterization  of  the  essence of
phenomenal properties rather than talking directly of their phenomenal essence. Drawing on
Trogdon (2016), the notion of phenomenal characterization points to the diverse guises, or
conceptualizations, under which we can have an epistemic access to a property. Rather than
implying that the nature of phenomenal properties is purely phenomenal (and not physical), I
leave  open  the  possibility  of  arguing,  in  an  anti-physicalist  fashion,  that  the  phenomenal
characterization of the essence of phenomenal properties is the only possible characterization
of these properties, while physicalists could argue that there is a physical characterization of
the essence as well. For convenience I shall often skip this detail in the rest of the paper, and
talk more sloppily of being presented with the phenomenal essence of phenomenal properties,
or more simply with the essence of phenomenal properties. 
Talking about the essence of something is often taken to go beyond modality (Fine, 1994).
All the essential properties of something are metaphysically necessary to it, but not all its
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necessary properties are essential to it. Take  Fine's well-known example: it is necessary for
Socrates to belong to the set whose only member is Socrates. But we are intuitively reluctant
to admit that this fact is part of the essence of Socrates. What then do we mean by “essence”?
Some have argued that it has to do with real definitions, what makes something be what it is
and nothing else (Fine, 1994, Oderberg, 2011). The details of such a view are disputed, but
here I will take it that the essence of something, say X, is one or a plurality of properties 2.
These properties can be said to be essential properties, and are associated with essential facts
of the sort “X has property F”. In the case of phenomenal properties, I shall talk of a plurality
of essential features, to avoid any confusion. The essence of phenomenal property X is thus a
plurality of features F, G, etc., and essential facts include that X has F, X has G, etc. It is
notoriously difficult to give precise examples of essential features of phenomenal properties:
it could be argued that a phenomenal property essentially has a specific internal structure, that
it essentially has a specific functional role, or simply that it essentially has a specific look (and
that its essence is not analyzable beyond its look).
I  will  take it  for granted that  the presentation of the essence of something to us must
involve some potential propositional knowledge about its essential facts, that is, knowledge
that, say, X has F. This goes further than availability for further cognitive processes, which is
one characteristic of the notion of presentation mentioned in  the introduction.  What I  am
pointing at here is that if we are presented with the essence of X, then we should be in a
position to know, under ideal cognitive conditions, all the essential facts about X. In other
words, only additional cognitive and attentional conditions are required for the subject to gain
propositional knowledge about the essential properties of X. Conditions may include attention
to the phenomenal property, acts of concept formation, absence of various cognitive biases,
etc.  This  propositional  knowledge  involves  deployment  of  concepts,  but  might  not  be
expressible in public language.
2 Again I leave open the possibility of characterizing these properties under different guises.
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All  of  that  is  controversial.  Those  who  insist  that  Revelation  primarily  consists  in  a
metaphysical connection between the subject and her phenomenal properties could be tempted
to argue that there is no such straightforward path from what is presented to us to what we
propositionally  know about  it.  These  views  are  especially  compatible  with,  although  not
directly  deducible  from,  the  claims  that  Revelation  fundamentally  involves  knowledge of
things and not knowledge of truths (Russell, 1994, Tye, 2009), or that metaphysical presence
does not entail cognitive presence (Balog, 2012). On these views, although subjects might be
able to make justified judgments of the form “I am experiencing the essence of  this” while
focusing their attention on the experienced phenomenal property, even a subject with ideal
cognitive abilities would not be able to make judgments of the form “this has feature F” for
each F essential feature of the phenomenal property. Philosophers who defend such a view
would  disagree  with  my  variant  of  Revelation,  but  to  my  knowledge  nobody  explicitly
endorses it.  Finally, it is not clear whether those who think that we know the counterfactual
extension of our phenomenal concepts are committed to the variant of Revelation that I will
use (Chalmers, 2003, Nida-Rümelin, 2007, Damnjanovic, 2012)3. 
The argument I am going to expose in the remainder aims at undermining the variant of
Revelation just introduced. Note that this variant cannot simply be rebutted by pointing out
that normal human beings are not able to exhibit and verbally express essential facts about
their phenomenology (let alone all their essential facts), that we often seem to disagree over
the best description of our phenomenal properties, or that we often make blatant mistakes in
these descriptions. I readily admit that this is the case, and that whatever it is that is presented
to the subject, the latter has great difficulty in reporting it appropriately (Schwitzgebel, 2008).
However, Revelation as I understand it only says that if further conditions (notably on our
3 While these views hold that we are presented with the essence of phenomenal properties, it is less clear
whether they would agree with the claim that this essence has to be potentially accessible to subjects in a
propositional way. 
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cognitive abilities) were fulfilled, we would be able to verbally express all the essential facts
about our phenomenology, we would not disagree (except if there are genuine inter-individual
differences in phenomenology), and we would not make any mistakes. Revelation, as I shall
use it, is consistent with introspection being largely unreliable, and this unreliability is to be
explained  in  terms  of  mistakes  of  miscategorization,  terminological  variations  between
locutors, etc. (Bayne and Spener, 2010, Giustina and Kriegel, 2017). 
3 Phenomenal relations
There are many senses in which phenomenal properties can be said to stand in relation
with  other  phenomenal  properties.  For  example,  many  phenomenal  properties  can  be
experienced spatially, especially visual properties. Phenomenal relations therefore include “X
being on the left  of Y”, “X being under  Y”, etc.  Phenomenal properties can arguably be
temporally structured as well: “X occurring before Y”, for instance. Both spatial and temporal
relations,  however,  seem to be external to phenomenal properties like phenomenal colors.
They do not  depend upon, nor  are  fixed by, what  the phenomenal  colors  really  are.  Our
experience could instantiate phenomenal red in the top-left corner of our visual field, but we
are not  tempted to  think that  its  location in  our  visual  field is  part  of what  it  is  for our
experience to be of phenomenal red.  
Consider now the relation of similarity between phenomenal red32 and phenomenal red25
(two  determinate  nuances  of  phenomenal  red)  and  the  relation  of  quantity  between  two
different levels of loudness. In these cases it seems that the relations are internal. Phenomenal
red32 would not be what it is if it did not bear this particular relation with phenomenal red25,
etc. They are somehow fixed by the essence of the phenomenal properties (Hardin, 1992 for
9
the example of colors, Clark, 1993, Schroer, 2010)4. Similarity and quantitative relations, the
relations that I will focus on, are very diverse.  Similarity relations come in various degrees.
There  are  two-place  similarity  relations,  like  “X  is  similar  to  Y”,  three-place  similarity
relations, like “X is more similar to Y than to W” and four-place relations, like “X and Y are
more similar than W and Z”. Regarding quantitative relations, it is common to distinguish
between  different  scales,  each  one  being  associated  with  a  specific  kind  of  quantitative
relations. Take the example of loudness. The least binding scale is ordinal, and is roughly
associated to the relation “X is louder than Y”. An interval scale enables to make sense of
distances between determinates of loudness, and is associated to relations that compare the
distances between two pairs of determinates. Finally, a ratio scale introduces a zero-level of
brightness, and is associated to relations like “X is  twice as loud as Y”. It is notoriously
contested whether phenomenal properties stand in more than ordinal quantitative relations
with each other (see Michell, 1999).
Before going further, several caveats are necessary. What are precisely the bearers of these
relations? In the case of the relation “louder than”, at least three candidates come to mind:
overall phenomenal experiences, phenomenal sounds (the phenomenal properties associated
to  hearing  physical  sounds),  and determinates  of  loudness.  The latter  two can  be  rightly
described as phenomenal properties. Each option reflects deep theoretical commitments about
the metaphysics of our experiences, but a detailed discussion of these alternatives would take
4 At this point the reader might point out a hidden assumption. Perhaps similarity and quantitative relations
are only theoretical constructs, postulated to account for the results of psychophysical experiments. Or they
are  merely  inferred  from  phenomenal  facts  (i.e.,  facts  made  true  only  by  what  it  is  like  to  have  an
experience) supplemented with some prior beliefs, like the property of reminding the subject of her vacation
last summer. In such cases, these relations would not be phenomenal. I lack the space to mount a compelling
argument in favor of the phenomenality of these relations, but I think that this view is by far the most
intuitive and commonsensical.
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me too far. I do not wish to commit myself to any particular view in this regard, as the issues I
shall  be  interested  in  are  largely  independent  from the  ontological  status  of  phenomenal
entities. I shall generally have it that the relata of these relations are phenomenal properties,
and not experiences, and I leave it to the reader to substitute his or her preferred account of
the bearers of these relations in the course of the discussion.
If we were to make a list of all phenomenal internal relations, it should quickly become
obvious that some of them are superfluous. This is because it is easy to define some of these
relations in terms of others. Ordinal quantitative relations can be defined in terms of cardinal
quantitative relations, for example, since a cardinal scale contains all the information given by
an ordinal scale and adds to it (Roberts, 1985). The three-place similarity relation “X is more
similar to Y than to W” can trivially be defined in terms of the four-place similarity relation
“X and Y are more similar than X and W”.
Even more interesting is the possibility that whole families of relations be defined in terms
of others. For example, determination relations, for example between phenomenal red and
phenomenal red32 (a particular nuance, i.e. a determinate, of phenomenal red) might ultimately
be  nothing  more  than  similarity  relations  between  nuances  of  phenomenal  red.  Roughly,
phenomenal red could be said to be the set consisting of phenomenal red1, phenomenal red2,
…, phenomenal red32, etc., grouped together because they are more similar to each other than
to other phenomenal colors. 
While I do not have a definite answer to which relations can be defined in terms of others,
it matters insofar as we need to ground only the latter, the most fundamental ones. The views
developed in the next section will help identify the potential fundamental relations.
Are similarity and quantitative relations really internal? Well,  that a relation is  internal
implies that it is necessary to its relata. A first way to question the internality of these relations
is thus to deny that they are necessary. This proposal is dubious on the face of it, but a detailed
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discussion exceeds the scope of this paper. Once we admit that they are necessary, it is hard to
resist the conclusion that similarity and quantitative relations hold in virtue of what their relata
are, that they do not simply happen to be necessary to them. This is why internality can be put
in terms of grounding. There are essential  facts about the phenomenal relata that together
ground the  fact  that  the  relation  holds.  More  formally,  let  X and Y be  two phenomenal
properties. A relation R of similarity or quantity holds between the two, that is, we have R
(X,Y).  R could be,  for  example,  the relations  “brighter  than” or “similar  to”.  R (X,Y) is
internal if and only if there exist features F and G such that X has F essentially and Y has G
essentially, and the facts that X has F and Y has G ground the fact that R (X,Y) (I simplify the
framework by focusing on binary relations, but extending it to n-ary relations is trivial).
4 What grounds phenomenal relations
To develop the argument against Revelation, it is important to understand how similarity
and  quantitative  relations  are  grounded  in  the  essence  of  their  relata.  In  terms  of  the
framework just outlined, the objective is to identify F and G, essential features of phenomenal
properties X and Y, which together enable to ground a phenomenal relation. Two views are
proposed  here5,  which  both  lead  to  contradictions  with  Revelation  under  plausible
assumptions. I will then outline a way of generalizing the conclusion to other potential views.
The partial identity view
5 Interestingly, the two views outlined here to account for similarity and quantitative relations correspond to
the two views recently examined by Blumson (2018) to account for similarity in general.
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The partial identity view can be summarized by the following claims. First, phenomenal
properties are taken to have an internal structure, or composition6. Second, because of their
internal composition, similarity (and more controversially quantitative) relations can all be
defined  in  terms  of  identity  relations  between  components.  Third,  identity  relations  are
(trivially) grounded in the essential components of phenomenal properties.
Similarity between two entities is often taken to consist in the sharing of properties that the
two things have in common (Blumson, 2018). Peas in a pod are similar to each other because
they share many properties –greenness, roundness, etc. In this way, one can define similarity
relations  between  entities  in  terms  of  identity  relations  between  their  properties.  The
properties in common can also be mereological: a computer has a motherboard as part, and
the  sharing  of  the  same  model  of  motherboard  can  ground  the  similarity  between  two
computers.  By drawing on this  notion of partial  identity,  we can use identity  relations to
define relations of similarity, and, more tentatively, relations of quantity, as I shall show later
on. In this case, the F and G, essential features of X and Y that enable to ground relation R,
are any two essential features that are identical. 
Let  us  now apply  the  partial  identity  account  to  phenomenal  experience.  It  is  usually
accepted that phenomenal experiences can have parts (Lee, 2014). They have what may be
called a quasi-mereological internal structure. Consider the overall phenomenal experience a
subject is having at a certain time. If her overall phenomenal experience has auditory and
visual parts, then its phenomenal character P is arguably conjunctive and could be described,
for  example,  as  P =  visual  phenomenal  character  associated  to  seeing  a  tree  & auditory
phenomenal character associated to listening to a bird. For complex phenomenal characters
composed, say, of a visual and an auditory component, similarity can just consist in sharing a
6 This internal structure need not be mereological, but the view has mostly been applied to structures that are
comparable  to  parts/whole  structures,  so  I  will  nevertheless  continue  to  talk  of  partial identity  for
convenience. This implies that they are not unanalyzable.
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certain number of components. For instance, that the auditory components of two different
phenomenal  characters  are  identical  can  ground  a  similarity  relation.  This  is  rather
uncontroversial. But what we are interested in are phenomenal properties such as phenomenal
red  or  loudness,  and  not  complex  phenomenal  characters.  The  former  are  not  obviously
conjunctive in the way that the latter are. Rather, they seem to be singular, or synthetic (Byrne
and Hilbert, 2008). In short, they do not seem to have any quasi-mereological structure. So we
have to extend the partial identity account from a domain where it is a natural fit (complex
experiences and phenomenal characters) to a domain where it is much more controversial
(“simple” phenomenal properties like phenomenal orange or loudness), in order to account for
similarity  relations  within the latter.  Are apparently simple  phenomenal  properties  in  fact
complex?
Take  phenomenal  colors.  It  could  be  argued  that  phenomenal  red  is  more  similar  to
phenomenal orange than to phenomenal blue because phenomenal orange and phenomenal
red  have  reddish  components.  Schroer  (2010),  for  example,  states  that  “the  previously
mentioned resemblance [in hue between phenomenal red and phenomenal orange] is the result
of their sharing a common element–it is the result of their sharing an element of reddishness”
(p.  514).  Sundström  (2013)  also  argues  that  mixed  colors  like  orange  are  complex,  by
appealing to successful phenomenological color models. Another domain where the partial
identity account seems successful could be phenomenal taste properties (Byrne and Hilbert,
2008). At least some similarity relations holding between taste properties could be taken to be
defined in terms of partial identity relations. 
The case for reducing similarity relations between phenomenal properties to partial identity
relations seems fairly promising. Are quantitative relations also reducible? 
Let us come back to the case of objects, which have mereological properties. In the case of
physical objects,  it  has been argued that quantitative relations could be reduced to partial
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identity relations by appealing to what can be called a “Russian nesting dolls” model (Eddon,
2007). This view was developed for specific metaphysical purposes, but I will use it without
any commitment to its associated metaphysical theory. Take mass. On this account, an object
is heavier than another if it  has a part  which has the same mass as the other object. The
property of having a 10 grams mass has as constituents all the inferior mass properties, for
instance the property of having a 9 grams mass, the property of having a 5 grams mass, etc. If
an  object  instantiates  the  property  of  having  a  10  grams  mass,  then  it  has  a  part  that
instantiates the property of having a 9 grams mass, another that instantiates the property of
having a 5 grams mass, etc.  Armstrong develops this view through his notion of structural
universal (Armstrong, 1988), which Eddon (2007) sums up as follows: 
Think of quantitative universals as Russian nesting dolls. Within each doll there is
a smaller doll, and a smaller one, ad infinitum. The largest doll ‘‘contains’’ all the
other dolls: it shares many nested dolls with the second-largest doll, slightly fewer
nested dolls with the third-largest doll, and so on. [...] Likewise for quantitative
universals  −every  quantitative  property  has  an  infinite  number  of  ‘‘nested’’
constituent  universals.  Intuitively,  the  more  constituents  two  quantitative
universals  share,  the more similar  they are.  For example,  the  five grams mass
universal shares many constituents with the four grams mass universal, hence the
property of five grams mass closely resembles the property of four grams mass.
(2007, p. 387)
On this view there is a close parallel between the ordering of quantitative properties and
the mereological structure of objects.
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Applying it to phenomenal properties is not straightforward. One difficulty is, once again,
that the metaphysical structure of our phenomenology is disputed. On one interpretation, we
obtain that a phenomenal sound is louder than another when all the determinates of loudness
of the less loud phenomenal sound are also instantiated by parts of the louder phenomenal
sound (or, on an alternative metaphysics of our phenomenal properties, each determinate of
loudness quasi-mereologically contains all the lower determinates of loudness). Likewise, a
phenomenal color instantiates a determinate of brightness, and thus, on this account, its parts
must instantiate all of the lower determinates of brightness. That this phenomenal color is
brighter than another can thus be explained by the fact that it has in common some of its
lower determinates of brightness with the other phenomenal property. In any case, the gist of
this view is that if a phenomenal property instantiates a certain level of a magnitude, it has to
be somehow composed of all the lower levels of that magnitude.  
Does the partial identity view accommodate Revelation? As for similarity relations, in the
case of color mixture it is not clear whether we are really presented with phenomenal red
when we have an experience of phenomenal orange. There are large disagreements over how
to interpret such compound colors (Allen, 2011). But the failure of the partial identity account
to  conform with  Revelation  is  clearer  when it  comes to  quantitative  relations,  where  the
account  would  completely  contradict  Revelation.  When  we  have  a  single  experience
instantiating a phenomenal color with a certain determinate of brightness, the phenomenal
color  does  not  seem  to  have  a  Russian  nesting  doll  composition;  we  are  certainly  not
presented with all the determinates of brightness inferior to the determinate of brightness we
are intuitively presented with. When we compare two phenomenal colors instantiating some
determinates of brightness and conclude that the first is brighter than the second, we are not
judging that there are some determinates of brightness that both phenomenal colors share. The
judgment is not a judgment about partial identity. Moreover, if the partial identity account
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were true, there would be an asymmetry between the determinates of brightness superior and
those inferior to the one that the phenomenal color intuitively seems to instantiate. On this
account,  superior  determinates  would  be  altogether  absent  from our  experience,  whereas
inferior determinates, as constituents of the determinate of brightness that the phenomenal
color  seems  to  instantiate,  would  be  presented  to  us.  This  asymmetry  is  not
phenomenologically motivated. If we focus our attention on the degree of brightness that a
particular portion of our visual field seems to have, we are presented neither with superior
degrees of brightness nor with inferior degrees of brightness. 
I conclude that the partial identity view fails to comply with Revelation.
The quality space view 
We thus need to examine the idea that (at least some) similarity and quantitative relations
between phenomenal  properties  are  not  reducible  to  partial  identity  relations.  By leaving
behind the partial identity account, we abandon a highly attractive account, that puts forward
an  elegant  and  transparent  way  to  ground  similarity  and  quantitative  relations.  Its  main
difficulty is that it postulates that many phenomenal properties have an internal structure that
they do not seem to have. The similarity between the phenomenal sounds associated to two
successive  notes  of  a  piano  cannot  be  simply  reduced  to  a  partial  identity,  but  even
phenomenal colors, which I have previously interpreted as exhibiting a quasi-mereological
structure, are often treated as singular as well. The quality space view accounts for these facts.
According to the quality space view, a phenomenal property is not on a par with objects,
but  is  rather  a  point  in  a  multi-dimensional  space  (Clark,  1993,  Palmer,  1999).  The
dimensions of the space, contrary to parts, cannot stand alone and independently from the
other dimensions. Consider again the case of colors. They are commonly analyzed, not as
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having parts, but as having three dimensions, hue, saturation, and brightness, where hue can in
turn  be  analyzed  in  terms  of  relative  distance  to  pure  colors  like  phenomenal  red  or
phenomenal green (Palmer, 1999). On this account, relations of similarity between them are
not to be explained in terms of partial identity, but rather in terms of the relative distance
between them in the color space.  As for quantitative relations,  they merely correspond to
distances  in  the  quality  space  along  a  single  dimension.  On  the  quality  space  view,
phenomenal properties can then be coded by their coordinates in a quality space.
If we follow the spirit of this view, how are similarity and quantitative relations grounded?
Well, on this view these relations are ultimately reducible to the respective positions of their
relata in the quality space, and their positions are arguably essential features of the relata. 
I wish to defend the view that the relations have to be already present within the essence of
one  phenomenal  property,  because  no  essential  feature can  specify  the  location  of  the
phenomenal property without referring to other components of the quality space. This idea is
not  new;  it  lies  at  the  core  of  structuralist  accounts  of  phenomenal  properties  (defended
among others by Clark, 1993), according to which phenomenal properties are  nothing more
than points in a quality space. The fact that we can sometimes express the coordinates of a
phenomenal  property  using  a  sentence  such  as  “X  has  (x,  y,  z)”  (for  example,  “this
phenomenal  color  has  85%  brightness”),  where  x,  y  and  z  are  numbers  representing
magnitudes for each dimension, should not throw us off. (x, y, z) cannot be made sense of
without  referring to  other  features  of  the scales  which  they  belong to.  As a  result,  some
essential facts about a phenomenal property are that it belongs to a given quality space, and so
is the fact that this quality space has such and such structural features, like its dimensions. The
fact that there are higher or lower degrees of brightness should then be somehow already
implied by the essence of each phenomenal color taken separately. By knowing the essence of
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one phenomenal  property,  one could come to understand the structure of the phenomenal
space that it fits into, as well as the similarity and quantitative relations that it gives rise to. 
One way to flesh out  this  idea is  to  say that  what  grounds similarity  and quantitative
relations between phenomenal properties are locational relations between locational features.
These latter relations are internal in a strong sense, one that corresponds to what Marmodoro
and Yates (2016) call “internal1” relations: “R(x,y) is internal1 iff R(x,y) is essential to x and
y” (p. 8, 2016). On this view, internal relations “inhere in” what their relata essentially are.
This view comes close to Bradley's drastic claim, according to which “[e]very relation . . .
essentially penetrates the being of its terms and is, in this sense, intrinsical” (Bradley, 1897,
quoted in Marmodoro and Yates, 2016). As a result, in order to know the essence of locational
features, we have to know in addition all the locational features that are related to them. If
locational relations are internal in this sense, then from the essential fact that phenomenal
property X has locational feature F, one can  logically derive the fact that X stands in some
similarity or quantitative relations with anything that has one of the locational features that F
essentially relates to. What it takes for something to stand in some similarity or quantitative
relation with X can be found within its essence.
Problems arise when Revelation  is brought into play. Since Revelation states that we are
presented  with  the  essence  of  phenomenal  properties,  it  seems that  one  experience  of  X
should give us  access  to  all  the  quantitative  and similarity  relations  that  the  phenomenal
property  can  bear  in  virtue  of  its  location  in  the  quality  space, as  well  as  the  essential
locational features of the other relata in virtue of which the relations hold. Suppose  that a
subject already possesses the concept associated to, say, a certain degree of brightness (most
plausibly induced by a previous experience of this degree of brightness). It is uncontroversial
that she can come to understand, by having an experience of another degree of brightness, that
one is brighter than the other. What I am suggesting is that even without previous experience
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of brightness, one experience of a certain degree of brightness is sufficient to enable her to
grasp the other degrees of brightness and the quantitative relations that they give rise to.
Suppose that this latter, more controversial claim is true.
The consequences are deeply counter-intuitive and contradict common phenomenological
reports. Consider the following commonsensical claims: when we have a visual experience of
a  uniformly  red  patch,  we  have  a  unique  phenomenal  color  associated  to  the  red  patch
instantiated and presented to us, namely a certain nuance of phenomenal red; it possesses at
most one magnitude value for each of its dimensions; nothing about the other (phenomenal)
colors  is  given  access  to.  If  the  quality  space  view  and  Revelation  are  both  true,  these
intuitions prove to be false. One experience of a color gives us access to the location of a wide
range  of  other  phenomenal  colors  in  the  phenomenal  color  space.  An entire  phenomenal
structure  of  relations  and locational  essential  features  is  communicated  to  us  in  one  go7.
Boghossian and Velleman (1991) review a variant of this position for the case of colors, and
criticize it in an eloquent way:
If color experience conformed to this proposal, the difference between red and
orange would not only be evident from the experiences of seeing red and orange;
it would be evident from the experience of seeing red alone, since that experience,
by representing red as located in a property space of a particular shape, would
already intimate the locations of codeterminate properties. The characterization of
something as having a property located at longitude x, latitude y, and depth z in a
space  of  co-determinate  properties  would  already  suggest  the  location  of
7 It is usually thought that quality spaces are local. There is a color quality space, a gustatory quality space,
etc. Some have nevertheless argued that quality spaces were larger and transmodal, to the point where there
could be one single global quality space encompassing every phenomenal property (Tolliver, 1999, Pestana,
2005). If that is true, then by knowing the location of a phenomenal property in its quality space, we should
gain potential access to every phenomenal property.
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properties  to  the north or south,  properties to  the east  or west,  and properties
above or below. Yet the experience of seeing something as red does not by itself
reveal that the property now in view has a yellower neighbor (orange) and a bluer
neighbor (violet), nor that it has more or less bright and more or less saturated
neighbors, either. The current proposal has the unfortunate consequence that to see
one color is, in a sense, to see them all. [p. 103]
This conclusion holds only if the locational feature of a phenomenal property in a quality
space gives access to the whole structure of the quality space. This is required for indicating
its location in the quality space, or so I have argued. One might deny this and argue that there
is an essential locational feature that does the job of indicating the location of the phenomenal
property, but from which the rest of the quality space is not accessible. This essential feature
is  monadic.  In  the  case  of  brightness,  suppose that  phenomenal  color  X has  as  essential
feature a certain degree of brightness. On this alternative view, the degree of brightness is
monadic  and  does  not  hint  at  other  degrees  of  brightness.  And  yet  it  helps  to  ground  a
quantitative  relation  between  X and  other  phenomenal  colors  that  have  other  degrees  of
brightness,  such  that  a  subject  can  gain  access  to  the  quantitative  relation  once  she  has
experienced several degrees of brightness. 
The problem with this alternative view is that it leaves an explanatory gap. The locational
feature  enables  its  bearer  (the  phenomenal  property)  to  stand  in  relation  with  other
phenomenal properties (that have other locational features), but we lack an explanation as to
why it is so. If a similarity or quantitative relation is truly internal, and thus is grounded in
facts about some essential features of its relata, then we should arguably be able to answer the
following question: why is it that these essential features ground the phenomenal relation? On
the  alternative  view,  the  phenomenal  relation  supervenes  on  its  relata  in  virtue  of  some
essential features of the latter, but the crucial role of these essential features in grounding the
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relation  remains  mysterious.  One would  have  to  accept  as  a  brute  fact  that  the  monadic
locational features ground the similarity and quantitative relations. In contrast, the view that I
put forward states that by inspecting each of the locational features, taken separately, a subject
with ideal cognitive abilities can find the structure of the quality space that the locational
feature fits into. As a result, it avoids the explanatory gap and the brute fact view that follows.
Other discussions about resemblance between objects or universals have led to the brute
fact view that the partisan of the alternative view is committed to defend. To account for
resemblance between two entities, one can either appeal to intrinsic or essential facts about
each entity, or posit the existence of brute resemblance relations. To account for quantities,
one can either appeal  to  intrinsic features  of each quantitative property (an example of a
quantitative property is having a mass of 4 grams) or posit the existence of brute quantitative
relations (Eddon, 2013, Armstrong, 1988, Bigelow and Pargetter, 1988). The second option is
always unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, intuitively these relations are not brute,
they  are  to  be explained by what  their  relata  are,  and not  the  other  way around.  That  a
locational feature of a phenomenal property contributes to the grounding of some relations has
to be explained by facts about the locational feature. Second, if the brute relations are really
taken to be fundamental, then one may think that they can be freely recombined in different
ways. But this is dubious. A given phenomenal color is not contingently brighter than another.
It is necessarily so.
My conclusion that the quality space view contradicts Revelation is thus dependent on the
rejection  of  the  brute  fact  view,  but  I  have  provided  several  arguments  to  motivate  this
rejection.  Those  who are  nonetheless  ready to  accept  the  brute  fact  view may  reject  my
conclusion. If we accept this conclusion that the quality space view contradicts Revelation, we
obtain that the two most plausible views on what grounds similarity and quantitative relations
–the partial identity and the quality space views– both fail to comply with Revelation: the
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essential  features of phenomenal properties that they posit  to ground the relations are not
presented to us. The most straightforward way to avoid this contradiction, I argue, is to get rid
of Revelation.
Interestingly,  whether  or  not  the  partial  identity  and  the  quality  space  views  are
satisfactory,  we  can  construct  a  generalized  argument  against  Revelation  based  on  the
rejection  of  the  brute  fact  view.  Rejecting  the  brute  fact  view amounts  to  demanding an
answer to why such and such essential features of phenomenal properties contribute to the
grounding of similarity and quantitative relations. Suppose moreover that the only way to
provide such an answer, and thus to bridge the explanatory gap, is to make the similarity and
quantitative relations and all  the essential  features that  ground them present  or accessible
within  the  essence  of  each  of  their  relata,  i.e.  each  phenomenal  property.  This  is  a
controversial claim, but it is difficult to think of an alternative way. Note that not only the
quality space view but also the partial identity view have bridged the gap in this manner: from
the essence of anything we can indeed trivially derive what it takes for something else to
stand in partial identity relation with it. Now, if Revelation is true, we should be presented
with the similarity and quantitative relations and the features that ground them when having
an experience of a single phenomenal property, because they are accessible from its essence.
For  example,  take  the  quantitative  relation  “A is  brighter  than  B”:  one  experience  of  a
phenomenal color would give us access to all of the determinates of brightness, since all of
them can ground a relation “brighter than” with the experienced phenomenal color. Since this
is at odds with common phenomenological reports, a contradiction arises.
Of course, a full-fledged generalized argument would have to make clear what it precisely
means to say that the relations and the features that ground them are present or accessible
within the essence of each phenomenal property. This exceeds the scope of this paper, but I
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hope that  the outline of the argument  provided is  enough to make it  at  least  prima facie
plausible.
5 The consequences of the argument 
I have thus provided a specific argument, based on the partial identity and the quality space
views, and a generalized argument that shed some serious doubt on the plausibility of the
Revelation  thesis.  What  lessons  can  we  learn  from this  challenge?  If  the  arguments  are
convincing, Revelation as I understood it should be given up. But there are several ways to
resist the conclusion. 
First,  one  can  reject  some  of  my  initial  assumptions,  for  example  that  phenomenal
similarity and quantitative relations are internal. The problem is that the necessity of these
relations to their relata seems indisputable, so the Revelationist –the partisan of Revelation–
will have to find an intermediary position between necessity and internality, by accepting the
former but not the latter.
Second,  as  already  mentioned,  one  could  embrace  the  brute  fact  view and  argue  that
similarity and quantitative relations and the features that ground them need not be present
within each phenomenal property.  I  have pointed out the drawbacks of this  option in the
previous section. 
Third and finally, the most promising reply from the Revelationist may be to bite the bullet
and accept that the partial identity view and/or the quality space view are correct, but contest
that this entails a contradiction with Revelation. This may be achieved in at least two ways.
First, by arguing that our phenomenological descriptions might after all accommodate that we
are  presented  with  counterintuitive  features.  On  this  view,  supposing  that  phenomenal
quantities are to be explained by the quality space view, ordinary subjects would have access
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to  the  whole  quantitative  structure  of  loudness  within  one  phenomenal  sound and,  more
generally, to all the locational features that ground similarity and quantitative relations in the
quality space.  This response is dubious on the face of it.  It  would require a thorough re-
examination  of  common  phenomenological  descriptions  to  be  convincing.  Second,  and
perhaps more promisingly, by weakening the cognitive link postulated between the subjects
and what is presented to them. Let us develop this response in more details. One could admit
that  similarity  and  quantitative  relations  can  be  directly  or  indirectly  found  in  what  is
presented to us in an experience of a single phenomenal property, but point out that normal
subjects might not have the cognitive resources to effectively gain access to these relations
and the essential features that ground them. They might have difficulties identifying them in
or inferring them from their phenomenology. This is all the more plausible since it is well-
known that introspection is not reliable and mistakes are widespread, so we should not be
surprised  to  have  trouble  accessing  all  the  aspects  of  our  phenomenology.  Common
phenomenological descriptions of what is presented to us are thus simply mistaken, and I was
too hasty in taking their conclusions at face value.
While  this  move  seems  appealing  at  first  glance,  I  want  to  argue  now  that  it  faces
difficulties, for the kind of mistake at  play here is  of a different nature from the kind of
mistake at play in discussions about the reliability of introspection. The latter kind of mistake
is supposed to consist in an inadequacy between our phenomenology and the way in which we
categorize  and  conceptualize  it.  All  of  this  seems  to  point  towards  one  specific  kind  of
mistake,  that  of  misinterpretation  of  what  is  presented.  An  interesting  feature  of
misinterpretation is that most philosophers agree that interpreting our phenomenology is a
genuinely difficult task. It is in no way obvious what the right interpretation is, and we often
feel  torn  between  several  interpretations  of  the  very  same  phenomenological  data.  After
having  heard  the  arguments  from  different  parties  in  the  debates,  whether  there  is  a
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proprietary phenomenology of cognitive attitudes or whether some phenomenal colors are
phenomenally composed are questions that certainly have no obvious answer. 
Now, the sort of mistake involved in the argument of this paper seems utterly different: the
problem is  not  that  there is  something that  we all  experience –e.g.,  the essential  features
postulated by the partial identity or the quality space views– and then interpret in different
ways, but simply that what is supposed to be presented to us is simply not there, not presented
to us at all. There does not seem to be any quality space or Russian nesting dolls composition
(derivable from what is) presented to us when we experience a given phenomenal property.
We would struggle to point to the feature of phenomenal properties whose interpretation is
controversial and to explain the mistaken phenomenological reports, while this could arguably
be done for typical phenomenological disagreements. In other words, something that should
be (derivable from what is) presented to us is missing altogether.
The Revelationist could reply that she agrees that there are two distinct kinds of mistakes
at play here, but that this is precisely what is to be expected if the relations and the features
that  ground  them  have  to  be  derived from  the  locational  feature  of  the  experienced
phenomenal property. The  alleged additional inferential steps involved for the subject to get
from the essence of the phenomenal property to the relation and the features that ground it
explain our practical inability  to  do it,  or so the story would go.  The mistake would not
involve  misinterpretation,  but  rather  an  inability  to  infer  some  consequences  from  the
presentation of the essence. 
This reply is not convincing. On the one hand, we do manage to draw inferences from what
is presented to us all the time. We can count the number of persons that we see in a room, and
infer “I see five persons” from our perceptual experience only. From an auditory experience
of a chord, we can infer the pitch of the notes that are part of it. What would explain our
inability to do so when it comes to inferring the essential features that ground similarity and
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quantitative relations? On the other hand, if we experience two phenomenal colors at the same
time, we may easily judge that one is brighter than the other, which means that in this case we
do have access to the essential features that ground the quantitative relation. How would we
account for our ability to gain access to them when only one phenomenal color is presented to
us? Even though these remarks are not a decisive rebuttal, it is far from obvious how to make
the Revelationist’s reply convincing.
Revelation is arguably one of the main pre-theoretical assumptions that we have about our
phenomenal experience (Lewis, 1995). It is thus important to explore its limits for its own
sake,  and  the  argument  I  have  raised  here  points  toward  important,  perhaps  decisive,
limitations to it.  Those already skeptical of Revelation will find in my challenge additional
reasons to reject it.
As I mentioned earlier, Revelation is often taken to raise problems for physicalism. It is
clear how by abandoning Revelation we no longer need to reconcile physicalism with either
an enigmatic intimate connection between subjects and their phenomenal properties or with a
putative access to their ontological nature.  
I conclude with some final remarks about Revelation. One powerful intuition underlying
Revelation is that for each phenomenal property there is a class of phenomenal facts that is
presented to us every time we experience the phenomenal property. From there, Revelationists
are  tempted  to  argue  that  perhaps  this  class  of  phenomenal  facts  is  all  there  is  to  the
phenomenal  property,  such  that  we  are  presented  in  one  go  with  what  the  phenomenal
property really consists in. The arguments developed here challenge this move by exhibiting
some  phenomenal  facts,  namely  facts  about  similarity  and  quantitative  relations  between
phenomenal properties, that are not accessible to us even if they arguably do help to answer
the question of what a phenomenal property (essentially) consists in. This in turn undermines
an appealing  argument  for  anti-physicalism.  If  even some essential  phenomenal facts  are
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missing, we have no reason to argue for a particularly strong relation of acquaintance between
subjects and their phenomenal properties, one that would make all essential facts about them
presented to us.
It is finally quite surprising that the argument developed in this paper has not been made
more explicitly before. It has been  noted repeatedly how fundamental the quantitative and
similarity structures are to the phenomenal properties, to the point where they were often
considered as belonging to what we most certainly and clearly know about them. In this sense,
then, they are the features of phenomenal properties that seem to lend the greatest support to
intuitive variants of Revelation. Ironically, if the argument introduced in this paper is sound,
the fact that what grounds these relations is not presented to us undermines the very same
Revelation thesis.
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